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	<title>Some stuff &#187; RAM</title>
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		<title>IT security policy &#8220;research&#8221;</title>
		<link>https://blog.yhuang.org/?p=103</link>
		<comments>https://blog.yhuang.org/?p=103#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 23 Feb 2008 20:23:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>admin</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[charge decay]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[curious piece]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DRAM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[dram manufacturers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[error]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hardware]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[liquid nitrogen]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[magnitude difference]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[RAM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://scripts.mit.edu/~zong/wpress/?p=103</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&#8220;Researchers find way to steal encrypted data,&#8221; screams this article in the New York Times. Oh do they? But come&#8230; on&#8230;, what is this ridiculous demonstration? Okay, okay, it&#8217;s the IT Policy School over there, let&#8217;s cut them some slack. What they&#8217;ve come up with is a way to read seated DRAM under OS lock [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;Researchers find way to steal encrypted data,&#8221; screams <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/technology/22chip.html">this article</a> in the New York Times.</p>
<p>Oh <em>do</em> they? But <em>come&#8230; on&#8230;</em>, what is <a href="http://citp.princeton.edu/memory/">this ridiculous demonstration</a>? Okay, okay, it&#8217;s the IT Policy School over there, let&#8217;s cut them some slack. What they&#8217;ve come up with is a way to read seated DRAM under OS lock without specialized hardware, and if they said that, it would be fine.<br />
<span id="more-103"></span><br />
While I don&#8217;t care for their pseudo-slick presentation and shameless self-promotion (with a &#8220;blog&#8221;?), it is still a curious piece of work. Its unfortunate and regurgitated untechnicality leaves questions, though. DRAM is refreshed in tens of milliseconds, and since DRAM manufacturers are always trying to cut power consumption, I&#8217;m going to assume this rate is necessary to ensure reliable read out. There is a 3-order magnitude difference between that and the seconds to minutes reported that DRAM can be without power and still be read, during which time <em>exponential</em> charge decay takes place. Something else has to be going on, no? It just isn&#8217;t entirely clear that when the computer is turned off momentarily, on-board capacitors or even on-module capacitors aren&#8217;t discharging for long enough to residually power the refresh circuitry [*]. On the other hand, they claim they can remove the RAM completely and (with the help of liquid nitrogen) halt for an hour without power. I have some doubts as they dance around this issue.</p>
<p>As for real implication for security, there isn&#8217;t much, if only because this kind of breach isn&#8217;t fundamental. We already know that once indefinite hardware access to a running machine is first obtained (a practical requirement for this attack), there are always ways to compromise it. That&#8217;s how <a href="http://www.xenatera.com/bunnie/proj/anatak/xboxmod.html">the Xbox was cracked</a> &#8212; I&#8217;m talking about in-parallel probes on pins and traces, which can be just as well applied to the scenario here. Unless there are self-destructive mechanisms or other <em>fundamental</em> barriers to hardware access, we are just dealing with a matter of how high is the effort threshold. To fix it, encryption keys should not be stored in RAM in a detectable way, and any TPM modules that are currently being designed should have additional hardware security measures. That&#8217;s not hard to do, but in the meantime, let&#8217;s sit back and watch an uptick in the cracking of existing software and DRM protection schemes, as protected areas of RAM are opened up to easy hacking &#8212; a far more likely and practical fallout.</p>
<hr size=1>
<p>[*] I just read their full technical documentation, and they seem a little sloppy. They measure (and plot) total module read out error rate, but then fit a curve to it that they justify with MOSFET charge decay characteristics. Isn&#8217;t that right? Well, no: error rate should exhibit the typical digitizing water-fall effect of the comparator circuit.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>Windows Vista</title>
		<link>https://blog.yhuang.org/?p=28</link>
		<comments>https://blog.yhuang.org/?p=28#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 18 Nov 2006 09:05:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>admin</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[boot the system]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[command switch]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[host machine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[linux host]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[machine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[production]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[RAM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[remote desktop connection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[RTM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[VMWare]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://scripts.mit.edu/~zong/wpress/?p=28</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Back during RC1, I requested a key but never got around to installing it. Then RC2 came out. Now of course Vista has RTM&#8217;d and the official MIT release is supposed to be coming at the end of this month, but I finally decided to see what&#8217;s what and gave RC2 a go. I was [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Back during RC1, I requested a key but never got around to installing it. Then RC2 came out. Now of course Vista has RTM&#8217;d and the official MIT release is supposed to be coming at the end of this month, but I finally decided to see what&#8217;s what and gave RC2 a go. I was not about to blow away any production machine, but there was already a Linux host machine running some OS&#8217;s via VMWare, so that&#8217;s where the install went.</p>
<p>I had only two small problems. One, I had to repartition the only drive because I believed Vista docs, which said it required a min of 15GB. (The nice tool &#8220;gparted&#8221; did the trick of non-destructive repartitioning &#8212; when it didn&#8217;t crap out!) Turns out 15GB is total BS. A clean install of Vista Ultimate took 4-5GB on the disk. (I don&#8217;t remember having any choice over which version to install, strange!)</p>
<p>The second problem: The installer also refused to begin on a machine with less than 512MB of RAM since it&#8217;s the &#8220;minimum requirement.&#8221; I was poking around for a workaround online and saw people asking the same question. No answer was ever given (no command switch that I am aware of), only a swarm of trolls boasting about their new machines and how Vista could not possibly be useful on anything less than 1GB. Well, utter BS. It&#8217;s running right now on 256MB of RAM &#8230; Inside VMWare &#8230; On a physical machine that <i>actually</i> only has 512MB of RAM &#8230; Rendered over a remote desktop connection with all graphics turned on &#8230;. And tunneled over an uncompressed PPTP link. The machine is otherwise a P4 1.7GHz. It does just fine. I&#8217;m writing this in Vista right this moment and I wouldn&#8217;t be doing it if I felt the slightest bit of inconvenience. On a clean boot, the system eats around 160MB of RAM. That&#8217;s a lot more than the typical 60MB/80MB of 2000/XP, but it isn&#8217;t bad. The way I got it to install was this: I had to set 512MB of RAM for the virtual machine just to let the setup start (and the machine thrashed a bit &#8212; due to VMWare paging, not even due to the setup program), but as soon as setup rebooted for the first time, I switched the VM back to 256MB.</p>
<p>It is working well enough that I&#8217;m thinking of putting this on a real machine. The usability improvements are good and the sort that exercise the hardware improvements over the years &#8212; the Start menu search among them. The metaphors and idioms are still very much what was seen in XP though, so there is much continuity here. Maybe that&#8217;s why people say it&#8217;s XP Service Pack 11. But I think that&#8217;s a good thing in this case.</p>
<p>Next up, installing RDP 6 client for XP and Office 12 beta.</p>
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